krellor

Hey, sorry it took so long to see your question. Here is a paper (PDF) on the subject with diagrams.

https://www.research-collection.ethz.ch/bitstream/handle/20.500.11850/42365/eth-4572-01.pdf

The link is composed of two parts, the emitter and the receiver. The emitter captures the LF signal and up-converts it to 2.5 GHz. The obtained 2.5 GHz signal is then amplified and transmitted over the air. The receiver part of the link receives this signal and down-converts it to obtain the original LF signal. This LF signal is then amplified again and sent to a loop LF antenna which reproduces the signal that was emitted by the car in its integrity.

Edit: and here is a times article that covers the problem in one area. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/24/world/canada/toronto-car-theft-epidemic.html

Yeah. Shockingly people store things where it is convenient to have them. :) I’m glad I didn’t have a keyless system to with about.

I did read the article. I’m unfamiliar with the “hacking” tools or methods they mention given they use terms like emulator. I was simply sharing one wireless attack that is common in certain areas and why.

I think most of the wireless attacks aren’t trying to be so sophisticated. They target cars parked at home and use a relay attack that uses a repeater antenna to rebroadcast the signal from the car to the fob inside and vice versa, tricking the car into thinking the fob is nearby. Canada has seen a large spike in this kind of attack. Faraday pouches that you put the fob inside of at home mitigates the attack.

I’m not sure about what the article is referencing, which is probably a little more exotic, but relay attacks are very common against keyless cars. Keyless cars are constantly pinging for their matching fob. A relay attack just involves a repeater antenna held outside the car that repeats the signal between the car and the fob inside the house. Since many people leave the fob near the front of the house, it works and allows thieves to enter and start the car. Canada has has a big problem with car thieves using relay attacks to then drive cars into shipping containers and then sell them overseas.

So your comment made me go “lol, imagine buying a house in Russia.” Meaning my preconceptions were that most in Russia didn’t have the means to own a home.

But then I’m like, I don’t actually know that, let’s check it out.

According to this site home ownership in Russia is over 90%. So what you outlined is a real problem for people there, and changes some of my mental picture of Russian life.

The more you know!

I do occasionally. I’m mindful of my caffeine intake, so if I really want a hot beverage and herbal tea doesn’t cut it I can make up a light cup of coffee, or a mix of coffee and cocoa. I usually do this after I’ve had my coffee for the day or when I’m planning on having my regular coffee later than normal.

deleted by creator

I can appreciate that position, but let’s dig into the nuance a little bit.

After 2005 Israel had a temporary blockade which ended in 2006. After 2007 and the election of Hamas, a new blockade enforced by Israel and Egypt was implemented to isolate Hamas. Excerpt from Wikipedia:

Israel blockaded the Gaza Strip temporarily in 2005–2006. In 2007, after Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip, both Israel and Egypt have imposed an indefinite blockade of Gaza that is ongoing to present day, on the grounds that Fatah and Palestinian Authority forces had fled the Strip and were no longer able to provide security on the Palestinian side..

I fully recognize that traditionally a blockade can constitute an act of war, and exerts control over a region or country, so I understand why the UN considered a blockade am ipso facto occupation.

At the same time, where is the outrage against Egypt, and what less invasive measure do you propose Israel and Egypt take to ensure regional security when you have a neighbor whose stated purpose is the violation of UN recognized borders?

deleted by creator

Gaza or the West Bank? If both, then no and yes. Israel dismantled settlements in Gaza in 2005. Unfortunately, settlements continued in the West Bank, aggravating efforts to conclude the hand off of two of the three districts there.

Hamas is from the Gaza Strip, not the West Bank though. Gaza relations have been weird, but stabilizing with daily work travel through the border. Arguably, Hamas attacked now for fear that relations would continue to improve with Gaza, setting back their mission.

I would recommend people read the IAB ad blocker detection guide for Europe which provides a good summary of what is possible. It lays out the that depending on how the detection is done it might be defensible to rely on ToS, and to remove all risk, implement a consent banner, wall, or both.

Which is to say, even if it was ruled that YouTube can’t rely on ToS, which I don’t think is a sure thing, they would just have a consent wall like for cookies.

Yep that’s it. I’ll double check the link in my post.

Edit: yep borked the link, fixed now. Thanks for letting me know!

One thing I’ll add is I often found it helpful to glide them in which helps straighten the wires, then pull them out and trim the ends to be even. Then put back in connector, and make sure all pins touch all wire ends.

I suppose that’s my point though. Most of this thread, and the page linked have been asserting clear and unequivocal violation of gdpr, but that doesn’t appear to be true. It hasn’t been tested or ruled on authoritatively, and the technical mechanism makes s difference as well. There is room to equivocate.

My own personal opinion is that I doubt the EU policy makers or courts will treat the mechanism to ensure the delivery of ads with as much skepticism as they treat tracking, fingerprinting, and other things that violate privacy. Courts and policy interpreters often think of the intent of a law, and I don’t think the intent of GDPR was to potentially undermine ad supported business.

My goal in replying throughout the thread has been to address what feels like misinformation via misplaced certainty. I’m all for explicit consent walls, but most people in this thread don’t seem to be taking an objective look at things.

Here is a guide from a publisher trade group on the implementation of ad block detectors under gdpr.

It says that listing the use in your ToS is a defensible strategy but could have some risk. If the organization wants to further limit risk, they can add a consent banner, consent wall, or both.

My guess is Google is the risk accepting type on this issue and it’s willing to litigate to argue that its ToS is sufficient or the way they implement it differs from cookies. Either way, they could completely make this go away by asking a consent for ad delivery to their cookie notice.

That is addressed in the source I linked, which is an industry groups advice to publishers on the implementation of ad block detector. They specifically say that having it listed in your ToS is a defensible strategy but could have some risk. To mitigate the risk, you can introduce either a consent banner, consent wall, or both.

It’s an interesting read, and something I wish I’d had a few years ago in a prior role when I wrote my organizations gdpr strategy, though I’m not an expert on EU specific law.

All they need to implement ad block detection is user consent, which they likely cover on their terms of service and privacy policy.

Source

That doesn’t appear to be correct.

Executive Summary
• Ad blocker detection is not illegal, but might, under a strict interpretation of the ePrivacy Directive be regulated and require the informed consent of users.

• Depending on the technical implementation of ad blocker detection, such detection may be out of scope of the consent requirement of the ePrivacy Directive, or fall within an exemption to the consent requirement. But the legal situation is not very clear.

• Publishers who use ad blocker detection should update their privacy policy to
include use of ad blocker detection scripts.

• Publishers may want to err on the side of caution and obtain consent for the use of ad blocker detection scripts to preempt and avoid any legal challenges.

• Publishers could obtain consent by slightly modifying their existing compliance mechanisms for the use of cookies as the possible new consent requirement
emanates from the same law mandating consent for the use of cookies.

• Publishers could use two practical solutions to request and obtain consent for
the use of ad blocker detection: a consent banner or a consent wall.
Publishers could also make use of a combination of the two to complement
each other.

Source

I would agree. From the outside it makes it look like fragmentation within the union.